All Quiet on the Western Front

Trump and Milei Pledge to Advance the International Division of Labor

The international division of labor is being reorganized in Latin America. Washington is regaining strategic control over Venezuelan oil through agreements with Delcy Rodríguez’s government. Argentina is making its mineral resources available to major international investments aligned with US interests. El Salvador receives people deported from the United States and incarcerates them in its maximum-security prisons. Costa Rica participates in arrangements to receive migrants expelled from US territory. The continent not only supplies raw materials; it also takes on migration control and security functions that Washington transfers beyond its borders.

Israel is expanding its regional influence in close alliance with the United States. In April 2026, Javier Milei and Benjamin Netanyahu announced the Isaac Accords, aimed at extending Israeli political, military, technological, and commercial cooperation to other Latin American countries, following the model of the Abraham Accords promoted by Trump. In Colombia, Abelardo de la Espriella’s government has just restored the trade agreement with Israel and moved its embassy to Jerusalem, reversing the diplomatic rupture initiated by Gustavo Petro in 2024. As I recently pointed out, geopolitical competition with China is also being fought on cultural and religious terrain, through networks of influence whose origins can be traced back to the Cold War.[1]

The second round of Brazil’s presidential election, scheduled for October 25, could further expand this alliance. Flávio Bolsonaro is challenging Lula da Silva for the presidency. A Bolsonaro victory would bring South America’s largest economy politically closer to Washington. Brazil is a member of BRICS and a strategic trading partner of China. It also occupies a decisive position thanks to its energy resources, minerals, and industrial capabilities.

The hemispheric reorganization thus extends far beyond trade. It encompasses resource supplies, investment, military alliances, migration control, and networks of political and cultural influence. Under new technological and geopolitical conditions, the old power relations between center and periphery are resurfacing.

The State Returns, Although It Never Left

In an article published in June 2026, Evgeny Morozov describes a transformation of American capitalism. Behind Donald Trump’s theatrics lies a relatively coherent strategy: rebuilding US industrial, military, and technological power through increasingly direct state intervention.[2]

The Pentagon no longer confines itself to purchasing weapons. It participates in corporate financing, investment selection, and the reorganization of supply chains. Private equity funds, technology corporations, and public agencies work together to secure American supremacy over China.

State intervention itself is nothing new. As Morozov reminds us, the American state has always played a fundamental role in technological and military development. What matters now is that Washington openly embraces planning functions that, for decades, remained concealed beneath the rhetoric of the free market.

The 2025 National Security Strategy confirms this orientation. Washington declares the restoration of its industrial capacity a priority and explicitly invokes a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. Latin America is presented as a strategic region in which to secure resources, limit the influence of powers from outside the hemisphere, and promote the expansion of American businesses.[3]

The paradox is clear: the power that promoted economic liberalization for decades now considers the recovery of state intervention indispensable to protecting its industrial sovereignty.

Milei and the Free Market

While Trump champions state intervention to rebuild productive capacity, Javier Milei extols the virtues of deregulation, economic openness, and private enterprise.

Yet this opposition is misleading. Milei does not dispense with the state either. He uses it to establish exceptional legal, tax, and foreign-exchange conditions favorable to major investments.

The Incentive Regime for Large Investments (RIGI), established under Law 27,742, is his principal instrument. It grants tax and customs benefits, guarantees regulatory stability for thirty years, and progressively relaxes requirements to repatriate and convert export earnings into the domestic currency.[4]

This is not the disappearance of the state, but a redirection of its capacities. While Washington intervenes to strengthen strategic domestic industries, Buenos Aires establishes a special framework of guarantees and incentives for major investors.

The difference lies in the objectives each state prioritizes, the conditions it imposes on capital, and the productive capacities it seeks to develop.

Critical Minerals and Strategic Complementarity

The connection between these two policies is explicitly recognized in bilateral agreements.

The critical minerals framework signed on February 4, 2026, links US industrial demand and strategic stockpiling capabilities to Argentina’s RIGI. Both governments propose coordinating public and private financing, facilitating mining projects, and developing supply chains for advanced and defense technologies.[5]

The following day, the two countries signed a trade and investment agreement containing provisions on critical minerals, economic security, technology, and regulatory cooperation.[6]

The logic of this arrangement is clear: the United States seeks to secure resources essential to its industrial and military development, while Argentina offers favorable conditions for investments capable of supplying them.

The coordination of these policies reinforces an international division of labor in which Argentina’s strategic resources are integrated into production chains shaped by US industrial needs. Extraction and exports take precedence over the development of domestic technological and industrial capabilities.

The Persistence of Dependency

A report published by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in 2025 places these questions in historical perspective.[7]

Latin America possesses substantial reserves of minerals essential to the energy transition and contemporary technologies. Yet approximately 62% of its critical mineral exports between 2019 and 2023 consisted of unprocessed products or materials that had undergone only basic refining.

The abundance of natural resources does not guarantee industrial diversification, technological learning, or the development of domestic productive capabilities.

ECLAC emphasizes the need to combine foreign investment with industrial policies, supplier development, research, and stronger institutions.

The issue, therefore, is not simply who invests or how much capital flows into a country, but what kind of economic structure emerges from those investments.

An economy can increase its exports while retaining a subordinate position in global value chains.

All Quiet on the Western Front

Seen in this light, the apparent contradiction between Trump and Milei takes on a different meaning.

American economic nationalism and Argentine liberalism perform complementary functions within an international reorganization of capital accumulation. While Washington strengthens its industrial, financial, and technological capacities, Buenos Aires establishes privileged conditions for investments that help secure the strategic supplies required by the United States. Bilateral agreements on critical minerals formalize this coordination between their policies.

The reorganization promoted by Washington reproduces the asymmetries between center and periphery identified by Raúl Prebisch in 1949 and subsequently examined by Latin American dependency theorists. Integration into the world market, far from guaranteeing the development of productive capacities in peripheral economies, consolidates their subordinate position within the international division of labor.[8]

Competition with China, artificial intelligence, and critical minerals are bringing profound changes. But technological reorganization does not eliminate the historical asymmetries between those who control strategic activities and those who supply the resources that make them possible.

The irony is that the United States is reviving state intervention because it considers the free market insufficient to guarantee its economic sovereignty, while its Latin American allies use state power to open their economies, guarantee privileged conditions for foreign investors, and place their strategic resources at the disposal of US industrial needs. Here, neoliberal ideology reveals its instrumental character: the free market is invoked to justify opening up some economies, while state intervention is used to secure capital accumulation in others. The same logic operates within the core countries, where liberalization and public intervention are not incompatible principles but instruments that can be alternated or combined to promote accumulation and preserve the economic power of ruling classes.

Much is happening on the Western Front. Technologies change, governments come and go, and alliances break apart or are renewed. Yet beneath these transformations, an old international division of labor persists: some states secure their economic and geopolitical sovereignty by appropriating the resources and controlling the territories of others, subordinating their populations to the requirements of their own capital accumulation.

NOTAS

[1] Governments of Argentina and Israel (April 19, 2026). Joint Declaration of the Governments of Argentina and Israel. Declaration establishing the Isaac Accords. Official document.

[2] Morozov, E. (June 2026). “Cuando el Estado estratega fusiona defensa, capital-riesgo e inteligencia artificial” [When the Strategic State Merges Defense, Venture Capital, and Artificial Intelligence]. Le Monde diplomatique, Spanish edition.

[3] The White House (2025). National Security Strategy of the United States of America, especially pp. 13–19. Official document.

[4] Argentine Republic (2024). Law 27,742: Ley de Bases y Puntos de Partida para la Libertad de los Argentinos [Law on the Bases and Starting Points for the Freedom of Argentines]. Title VII, Articles 183, 193, 198, and 201. Official text.

[5] Argentine Republic and United States (February 4, 2026). Framework for Securing Supply in the Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals. Article 2. Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[6] Office of the United States Trade Representative (February 5, 2026). Agreement between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic on Reciprocal Trade and Investment. Sections 3–5. Official document.

[7] Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (2025). Inversión extranjera directa en la minería y potencial de los minerales críticos en América Latina y el Caribe [Foreign Direct Investment in Mining and the Potential of Critical Minerals in Latin America and the Caribbean]. ECLAC Keys to Development, No. 23. Full report.

[8] Prebisch, R. (1949). El desarrollo económico de la América Latina y algunos de sus principales problemas [The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems]. Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), United Nations, Document E/CN.12/89. Santiago, Chile. Available from the ECLAC repository: https://repositorio.cepal.org/handle/11362/30088